#Brit box generic failure series#

Then an overview study was performed to identify areas that merit subsequent and more detailed analyses. Reference descriptions for the basic types of LNG facilities were developed. A study of the effectiveness of these release prevention and control systems is being performed.

The liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry employs a variety of release prevention and control techniques to reduce the likelihood and the consequences of accidental LNG releases. It is concludd that for remotely located facilities many of these alternatives are probably not justified however, for facilities located in highly populated areas, these alternatives deserve serious consideration. In addition, an economic evaluation of these alternatives must be made so the costs and benefits can be compared. A more rigorous analysis of the absolute risk of LNG import terminal operation is necessary before the benefits of these design alternatives can be determined. All of these alternatives are technically feasible and have been used or more » considered for use in at least one LNG facility. These design alternatives would reduce the probability of a large release of LNG by reducing the expected number of failures which could cause a release or by reducing the magnitude of releases that do occur. Several design alternatives which have the potential to significantly reduce the probability of a large release of LNG occurring at an import terminal are identified. Reducing the rate of failure by improved design, better maintenance and testing, or adding redundancy of the critical system components for these plant areas and release scenarios will result in improved safety. Rupture of the main transfer line and gross failure of the storage tanks are the two release scenarios of primary safety interest. The two plant areas identified as being most significant with respect to safety are the unloading system and the storage system.

#Brit box generic failure series#

A series of potential release scenarios were analyzed to determine the frequency of the release events, the probability these releases are not stopped or isolated by emergency shutdown systems, the estimated release quantities, and the critical components of the system. I don't have a F19 Cyrus-IMAPd server (yet) so I cannot verify if the issue goes away when both the client and server are F19.The release prevention systems of liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal were analyzed. Similar issue as described above, but in this case, the Cyrus-IMAPd server reports:īadlogin: GSSAPI However, when I use the F19 virt-manager to connect to an F19 libvirtd, the SASL/GSSAPI connection occurs without issue.

Virt-manager spews the following warning when run on F19, connecting to an F18 libvirtd:Īuthentication failed: Failed to step SASL negotiation: -1 (SASL(-1): generic failure: GSSAPI Error: A required input parameter could not be read (Unknown error)) When using F19 programs including KMail/Akonadi or virt-manager, I am no longer able to connect to my F18 Cyrus-IMAPd or libvirtd services using SASL/GSSAPI.